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New Challenges in the Design of Microgrid Systems:  
Communication Network, Cyber-Attacks and Resilience 
Microgrids (MGs), referred to as the next-generation power systems, are receiving considerable attention 
from both industry and academia. Integrated with distributed energy resources (DERs), energy storage system 
and a variety of loads, microgrid functions as a localized power grid which can be operated independently or 
connected to utility grids. With the rapid development of technology in communication networks, the 
framework of MGs tends to be more distributed, intelligent and tightly integrated with networks. Applications 
of MGs can be found on the Internet of Things (IoT), Industry 4.0, Smart Cities, etc. 
However, due to the strong dependence on networks, the microgrid is more vulnerable to security threats. 
A malicious attacker can apply some kinds of attacks to the MG system, compromise the MG control and lead 
to disruptive events in the society. Such cases are posing new challenges to the design of the MG systems. 
Currently, the MGs are generally designed with technologies that can protect against communication delays 
or data dropouts and potential component failures during operations. However, due to the development of 
various intelligent attacks, traditional technologies behave very limitedly to secure the MGs. It is therefore 
essential to reexamine the existing techniques from the perspective of both cyber-layer and physical layer. 
1. Communication Network 
The microgrid is a robust platform that can help to build distributed electric power systems with high 
efficiency, sustainability, flexibility, intelligence. Due to the high penetration of renewable energy, microgrid 
usually works as a fully controllable unit. With the broad access to a variety of energy sources and loads, the 
distributed microgrid should possess the following features: 
Efficient: Persistent low energy use minimize demand on grid resources and infrastructure. 
Connected: Two-way communication with flexible technologies, the grid, and occupants. 
Intelligent: Analytics supported by sensors and controls co-optimize efficiently, flexibility, and occupant 
preferences. 
Flexible: Flexible loads and distributed generation/storage used to modulate energy distribution. 
Toward these requirements, it is necessary to develop the microgrid with desirable performances, such as 
a fast response, efficient energy distribution and a satisfactory power balance between supply and demand. 
The realization of these goals heavily relies on an efficient and secure interaction within the microgrid, and 
thus addresses higher requirements for the communication network. 
However, with the rapid development of advanced information and communications technology (ICT), 
the microgrid turns into a more complicated bi-directional P2P energy transaction network. Big data are 
generated and exchanged among heterogeneous resources to enhance the penetration of renewable energy and 
increase the flexibility of the consumption sector.  Therefore, compared with the traditional communication 
system, the microgrid communication system is more complex and may be exposed to security threats. 
Considering an attacker can deliver the attacks at any communication nodes and compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the microgrid, it is crucial to design a secure communication 
architecture for the microgrid to prevent the system from attacks. 
1. 1  Microgrid Communication Stack 
With the emergence of the Internet of Things, the concept of IoT-enabled microgrid emerges to facilitate 
communication among distributed energy resources, loads, energy storage system and the grid. As a 
consequence, the microgrid communication is constructed by a hybrid communicating network, including IoT-
domain and energy-domain. Therefore, it is necessary to design the communication network in both IoT-based 
demand side and bus-based supply side. 
Communication networks are generally established on the layered ISO/OSI (International Standards 
Organization/ Open Systems Interconnect reference) model. For example, the internet architecture is based on 
the TCP/IP model and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in the smart grid are based 
on Enhanced Performance Architecture (EPA) model. However, what is the difference among the standard 
OSI model, TCP/IP model, IoT model, EPA model and microgrid communication model? Fig. 1 presents the 
mapping of the microgrid communication stack model and standard communication stack model. It can be 
seen that the standard OSI model has seven layers while the TCP/IP model merging some of the OSI model 
layers provides a simplified concrete protocol suite for Internet communication. For the supply side, it uses 
EPA model which has only three layers to send and receive commands and data with SCADA through various 
protocols, such as Modbus, Profibus, CANbus, etc. For the demand side, more and more energy consumption 
sectors are being digitalized based on IoT architecture. Thousands of devices from different vendors are 
connected to serve various smart-X markets, such as smart homes, smart health, smart grids, smart transport, 
and so on. 
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Fig. 1 Mapping of Microgrid communication stack model and standard communication stack model 
1.2 Microgrid Communication Protocols 
Just like people need the same language, the microgrid system requires predefined protocols to exchange 
information among a different layer of communication stack successfully. The communication network of the 
microgrid can adopt the TCP/IP model as the backbone transmission protocol to access the public network. 
There are various types of protocols for the communication between two endpoints in the network access layer 
and application layer. Fig. 2 shows the microgrid communication protocols in these two layers concerning the 
supply and demand side, respectively. In the demand side, the IoT communication protocols are usually 
adopted. Different from the traditional request/response communication model, IoT prefers the 
publish/subscribe model, due to its high efficiency in exchange thousands of data via network. Whereas in the 
supply side, many popular electrical sectors used protocols such as MODBUS, PROFIBUS and DNP3 can be 
utilized based on Client-Server (Master-Slave) architectures using bus network topologies. 
Additionally, some international standards designed for power communication networks can be used in 
the microgrid communication network. For example, the IEC 61850 is employed for communication between 
devices in transmission, distribution and substation automation system. IEEE 1547.x can be used for 
interconnecting DERs with an electric power system. IEC 61986 is introduced for data exchange between 









































Fig. 2 Microgrid communication protocols in the network access layer and application layer 
1.3 Microgrid Communication Models 
From the operation perspective, it is also necessary to consider how devices from the supply and demand 
side connect and communicate with each other. It refers to communication modes. For the IoT-enabled 
microgrid system, there should be four types of communication modes, which are: (1) Device-To-Device 
communication model; (2) Device-To-Cloud communication model; (3) Device-To-Gateway communication 
model; (4) Back-End Data-Sharing Model. Each model has its framework and key features that will bring new 
and unique security challenges. Therefore, security and privacy should be considered respectively based on 
data transmission protocols of each model. Table I presents the summary of these four communication models 
in characteristics, typical protocols, considerations and challenges in security and privacy. 
Table. I Summary of four communication models 
Communication 
Models Characteristics Typical Protocols Security & Privacy 
Device-To-
Device Model 
▪ Devices connect and communicate directly 
without the intermediary layer 
▪ Over heterogeneous communication wired 
or wireless networks 
▪ Use small data packets of information to 
communicate 
▪ vulnerable to security threats due to direct 
wireless connection, mobility of end users 
and privacy issues in social applications 
▪ Bluetooth,  
▪ Z-Wave, 
▪ ZigBee4 
▪ Authentication and Authorization 
▪ Availability and Dependability 
▪ Non-Repudiation 
▪ Secure Routing and Transmission 
▪ Confidentiality and Integrity 
▪ Anonymity and Indistinguishability 
▪ Context Privacy 
▪ Unlinkability and Deniability  
Device-To-
Gateway Model 
▪ Devices are converged on a gateway 
which as a conduit to reach upper level 
services 
▪ The gateway layer takes over the 
combination of private networks and public 
networks. 
▪ The gateway can provide security and 
other functionality such as data and protocol 
translation 
▪ Usually used in the interoperability with 
non-IP devices. 
▪ Bluetooth Smart 
▪ IEEE 802.11 
(Wi-Fi) 
▪ IEEE 802.15.4 
(LR-WPAN) 
▪ Data Confidentiality 
▪ Data Integrity  
▪ Authentication of devices and services 
▪ End-to-End Encryption 
▪ Secure Onboarding 
▪ Firmware Updates 
▪ Integrity Management 
Device-To-Cloud 
Model 
▪ Devices connect directly to the cloud-
based services 
▪ Over the IP network 
▪ The upper level energy-aware services and 
applications resident in the cloud. 
Outsourced storage and computation bring a 




▪ Identity Privacy 
▪ Location Privacy 
▪ Node Compromise Attack 
▪ Layer Removing/Adding Attack 
▪ Forward and Backward Security 




▪ Enable users to export and analyze smart 
object data from multi-data sources. 
▪ Allows the data collected from single IoT 
device data streams to be aggregated and 
analyzed. 
▪ An approach to achieve interoperability 




▪ Oauth 2.0 
▪ JSON 
▪ End-to-End Encryption 
▪ Platform & Application Integrity 
Verification  
▪ Big Data Threats  
▪ Public Key Infrastructure 
▪ APIs Security 
▪ Localization and Tracking 
 
2. Microgrid Security Challenges 
2.1 Cyber-attacks 
Driven by the rapid development of technologies in communication networks, the MGs open a 
communication network over large geographical areas. The strong dependence on communication networks 
makes MGs vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Therefore, it is crucial to study the cyber-attacks of microgrid systems 
as well as their solutions. According to the different strategies performed by the attacker, various types of 
attacks can be defined. Some of the most common cyber-attacks are: deny of service (DoS) attack, false data 
injection (FDI) attack, replay attack, etc. 
The DoS attack is a kind of attempt to make the system resources unavailable. From the technology point 
of view, attackers can fill buffers of user domains or kernel domains, jam the shared network medium to prevent 
measurements and actuator data from reaching their destinations.  
False data injection attack is a type of cyber-attack, in which the data integrity is modified among different 
cyber-parts. For instance, in microgrid systems, adversaries may launch attacks through hacking remote 
terminal units such as sensors in substations. It is worth mentioning that false data injection attacks in different 
scenarios can also be called deception attacks or malicious attacks. 
A replay attack is a natural strategy, in which valid data transmission is fraudulently repeated or delayed. 


































     
    
     
Methodologies Principles Limitations
• State estimation • Estimate system states • Cannot detect intelligent attacks
• Statistics • Monitor the statistics of measurements • Cannot detect intelligent attacks
• Observer/Filter • Monitor the system with residual signals • Difficult to design
• Data-based • Build a system model by historical data • Heavy training burden
• Model decomposition • Portion the system into several subsystems • Undesirable in large scale system
• Disturbance decoupling • Eliminate the effect from disturbances • Difficult to design
   
       
  
     
   
    
       
Methodologies Principles Limitations
• Pattern detection • Compare data packets with attack database • Cannot detect new attacks
• Anomaly detection • Compare network with normal performance • Increase communication burden
• Third-party detection • Make authentications to the data packets • Increase communication burden
   
   
    
   
         
    
   
       
  
     
   
    
       
     
    
     
   
   
    
   
         
    
Methodologies Principles Limitations
• Rate limiting • Limit the packet transmiting rate • Lower system dynamics
• Firewall • Compare the data packets with blacklist • Cannot deal with new attacks
• Topology resilience • Design multiple network resources • Increase system cost
     
   
    
       
     
    
     
   
   
    
   
         
    
   
       
  
Methodologies Principles Limitations
• Time delay • Design the controller based on delay system • Only effective on DoS attack
• Model prediction • Estimate states to compensate the packet drops • Only effective on DoS attack
• Switching system • Design the controller based on swtching system • Only effective on DoS attack
• Secure state estimation • Make a state estimation from corrupted sensors • Rely on the number of  good sensors
 
Fig. 3 Summary of attack detection and mitigation methods 
2.2 Cyber-attack Detections 
For systems without enough security protection strategies, malicious attacks may induce damage to power 
supplies and thus leads to significant societal benefits or the loss of human lives. Different from system faults 
whose characteristics are generally known in advance and act in a straight way to the system, on the contrary, 
the cyber-attacks are usually occurred randomly and perform in a coordinated fashion to prevent themselves 
from being detected. Thus, it leads to the requirements of increasing the sensitivity of detection schemes to 
cyber-attacks. Taking the security issues into consideration, the design and analysis of attack detection schemes 
for microgrid have been recognized more and more attractive, which can be designed in the network layer and 
physical layer. Fig. 3 presents a summary of various attack detection and mitigation methods. 
2.2.1 Network layer 
Attack detection mechanisms deployed in the network layer can be divided into pattern detection, 
anomaly detection and third-party detection. Pattern detection monitors the communication network with a 
database that stores the signatures of known attacks. The obvious drawback is that it cannot detect new attacks. 
The anomaly detection method periodically compares the system performance with a predefined model under 
normal conditions. The model can be a fixed standard model or a well-trained time-varying model. The third-
party detection approach, such as authentication, watermarking, encryption methods and key management 
methods, relies on the external message that can provide characterizations to the secure signals, by a variety 
of protocols or low-cost hardware. The data without the related characterizations are deemed as malicious 
attacks. However, the cost of this approach is the delay performance becaue it needs to encode and decode the 
external message before and after data communication. The longer and complicated the message, the more 
secure the authentication scheme is, the worse the delay performance. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between 
communication security and computational efficiency.  
2.2.2 Physical layer 
In the physical layer, the detection is mainly achieved by well-designed controllers of microgrid and 
converters. For such detection schemes, all kinds of attacks can be treated as the modification of operations 
and measurements, which is FDI attack. Generally speaking, the studies on attack detection can be classified 
into two categories, i.e., model-based scheme and data-based scheme. The model-based scheme such as state 
estimation, observer-based and statistical methods rely much on the system model. Thus, the appropriate 
model-based detection scheme should have a high model fidelity to handle parameter uncertainties and 
unknown disturbances. Furthermore, data-based approaches rely on machine learning or statistical 
mechanisms technique to infer a model for the system under inspection from both historical data and online 
measured signals. However, these methods usually face a heavy computational burden to train a fully 
connected network. 
Although remarkable progress has been made in detecting attacks during the past decade, most of the 
studies mainly focus on centralized architectures. Indeed, these approaches are becoming increasingly 
unpractical to deal with attacks as a result of the complexity induced by large scale distributed MG systems. 
Therefore, distributed attack detection schemes should be further investigated in terms of different ways to 
deal with the relationships among interconnected subsystems.  Model decomposition methods and disturbance 
decoupling methods can be addressed to deal with distributed attack detection problems for small scale and 
large scale MG systems, respectively. 
2.3 Attack Mitigation 
Attack mitigation of the microgrid plays a key role in securing the system. It aims at maintaining stability 
and providing acceptable performances to the grids under malicious attacks, especially in some cases where it 
is not possible to shut down a system, e.g. hospitals and large power plants.  
2.3.1 Network layer 
The principle of attack mitigation in the network layer is to reduce the impact of the attack on the 
communication links. Rate-limiting is one approach that imposes a rate limit on the packets, such that it can 
prevent DoS attacks. Furthermore, the packets can be dropped if their source addresses come from a blacklist. 
Another way to mitigate the attack is to add more communication channels or topologies. An attacker can 
delay, alter, drop or inject new packets in the communication link. Thus, once detecting an attack in a specific 
channel, the system can isolate the channel and move to another predefined channel, thus isolating the attack 
sources or machines. 
2.3.2 Physical layer 
The essence of attack mitigation in the physical layer is the discussion of different ways to recover system 
states and to achieve secure control. In terms of DoS attack and false data injection attack, a variety of attack 
mitigation strategies can be designed, respectively. 
According to the impact of DoS attacks on the system, they can be defined as weak attack scenarios and 
strong attack scenarios. Weak attack scenarios are relatively moderate, which presents cases that only 
additional time delay and packet loss are introduced into the system. Thus, a simple secure control strategy 
can be obtained by considering the network under attack as a time-delay system. In other cases that the induced 
packet loss has compromised some of the communication links, model prediction, or state prediction can be 
adopted to compensate the data dropouts, and thus leads to secure control. Strong attack scenarios are situations 
that the communication networks between controllers and plants are almost completely congested. In such 
cases, the secure control can be obtained by considering the networks as switching systems between normal 
conditions and attacked conditions. 
The FDI attacks can generate more intense effects on the system than DoS attacks, thus making it 
unreliable to model the system as either a time-delay system or a switching system. To provide secure control, 
secure state estimation, which aims to estimate the states from corrupted measurements has attracted 
considerable attention. The secure state estimation problems can be categorized into attack space search 
method, convex relaxation method and attack estimation method. It is worthy to point out that the output 
signals are only guaranteed to be reconstructible if a particular upper bound on the number of attacked sensors 
is met. Therefore, redundant sensors can help to achieve a state recovery.  
2.4 Research Challenges 
Although considerable attack detection and secure control approaches have been reported in recent years, 
some security issues remain several challenges. In the real world, many industrial processes involve nonlinear 
properties due to their characteristics and external environment, which make the detection more challenging 
compared with linear systems. Additionally, multiple sensors or meters links can be hijacked at the same time, 
especially in the case where a large number of sensors are considered. However, most attack detection methods 
assume the single attack hypothesis in the system. Attack detection approaches for multiple attacks require to 
be further investigated. Furthermore, most methods can only detect one specific kind of attack. They may fail 
in detecting other types of attacks. For example, a well-designed detection method for DoS attack may be 
ineffective for a replay attack. Therefore, the design of algorithms that can deal with various kinds of attacks 
is of extreme importance. Apart from this, traditional attack detections are usually designed separately at the 
network layer and physical layer. The co-design of detection approaches may handle attacks in more 
sophisticated and complex cases. Concerning the secure control strategies, most of the methods only consider 
a single common system. Those methods are undesirable for large scale MG system due to high computational 
resources and communication bandwidth limitations. Therefore, secure control in a distributed manner 
deserves to be studied. 
3. Microgrid Resilience 
Although the attack detection and mitigation method can 
eliminate the effect of malicious attacks, they all perform in the 
controller layer. Additional actions must be designed in the 
system level to handle accidental events. This means that the 
resilience of microgrid requires to be strengthened to prevent 
physical destruction from cyber-attacks. The resilience of 
microgrid can be defined as the capability to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from attacks and extreme events.  Fig. 4 
list the summary of microgrid resilience. Conceptually, it differs 
from the reliability that mainly focuses on potential low-impact 
events and can be studied case by case. Whereas, the resilience 
is dealing with unknown high impact events. Furthermore, the 
occurrence of these events is highly uncertain and cannot be predicted. Therefore, the system with high 
reliability may not be remarkably resilient. As the potential cyber-attacks may lead to a power blackout and 
cause severe social impacts, the microgrid must have the self-healing ability to continue operations in the 
presence of attacks. However, different from existing methods, the restoration procedure should be completely 
automated independent of demand from network operators. Therefore, the microgrid system needs to present 
some autonomous characteristics to achieve system restoration. This askes the microgrid to have a sense of 
situational awareness that is preparedness, perception and responsiveness, shown as Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 4 The microgrid resilience 
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Fig. 5 The situation awareness 
3.1 Preparedness 
The microgrid should also be well prepared to face the security threats, to continue working and prevent 
the system from destructions after an attack. Firstly, the microgrid can employ a reinforced power 
infrastructure, such as fortified PCCs, cables, or power devices, to withstand severe events. Secondly, the 
system could have a certain resilience with redundant topology design such that it can guarantee the fault ride-
through operation. For example, a loop-based topology can enhance microgrid resilience, as it provides 
multiple paths for delivering power. Thirdly, the converter controller can be developed with multiple protection 
schemes to allow the unfaulty switches running and bypass the faulty switches by modifying the modulation 
method. Fourthly, the implementation of an adaptive topology or extra hardware is also helpful in improving 
the microgrid resilience. The use of parallel redundant converters is a typical example of industrial applications.  
It is worthy to point out that such a method requires high precision to determine the time for switching the 
redundant hardware. Fifthly, the implementation of microgrid clusters can increase the stability of the entire 
system. Compared with only one microgrid, the microgrid cluster has more capability in the prevention of 
power blackouts. Last, the microgrid in some communities can be equipped with backup power sources or 
hybrid energy sources in case of device or system failures. 
3.2 Perception 
The microgrid system needs to have the ability to continuously monitor the system states in real-time, 
such that the system can prepare operational measures to limit the impact of potential damage in advance. The 
monitoring scheme should include distributed attack detection and islanding detection. Attack detection is the 
first step towards securing the system. The converter must be equipped with a robust attack detection scheme 
to deal with various types of attacks. Furthermore, unintended islanding may be triggered by an attack, which 
must be detected as fast as possible. Because the islanding detection methods usually rely on the analysis of 
voltage and frequency deviation, voltage unbalances and harmonic distortion, a trustworthy PLL technique of 
crucial importance. 
3.3 Responsiveness 
The microgrid is expected to have the responsiveness, which can respond to the severe situation in a 
reliable manner and provide some restoration capabilities to the entire system after the occurrences of potential 
attacks. At the converter level, the converter should possess a self-awareness that can react to the system with 
local information and resources. While, at the microgrid level, the converter keeps cooperation awareness, 
which can collaborate with other converters in the system. 
3.3.1 Converter level 
Typically, the microgrid usually operates as grid feeding in grid-connected mode. To maintain the 
functionality of the power system, the converter can shift automatically to grid forming mode, which helps to 
restore the power system without enduring significant transients. However, this requires a reliable plug and 
play control design and stability analysis for the converters. 
3.3.2 Microgrid level 
The responsiveness in the microgrid level consists of reconfiguration and cooperation awareness. 
Reconfiguration scheme can achieve a self-healing awareness to reconfigure the network and utilize local 
energy sources. If the main grid or the neighbor microgrid is corrupted by the attacks, the microgrids can 
perform an islanding option, operate autonomously and schedule optimally, thus mitigating the impact of 
attacks within the microgrid.  In this case, the local energy storage system and backup generation sources 
should sustain the power supply correctively. Possible load curtailment may be a necessity under severe 
conditions. Additionally, the islanded microgrids shall be reconnected to the main grid seamlessly when the 
main grid has ridden through the extreme conditions. This method requires powerful islanding and 
synchronization technologies. 
Cooperation awareness allows the various energy sources to work in a coordinated way to sustain the 
microgrid. A typical problem in this perspective is the power-sharing, which can be performed by a 
standardized droop-based hierarchical control approach. However, it may fail when dealing with the reactive 
power and harmonic current sharing problem, especially in severe conditions. How to share and compensate 
the reactive power and harmonic current between each DGU is becoming a new challenge in microgrid design.  
Modified droop and virtual impedance methods are two alternative solutions to solve this problem.  
3.4 Discussion 
The resilience of microgrid can be improved by introducing the situational awareness to the system. With 
sufficient preparedness, the microgrids can withstand severe disruptions and maintain functionality during 
attacks. The perception of the microgrid can monitor the system performance and trigger an alarm in the 
presence of attacks. The responsiveness is the countermeasures that can avoid system failures or destructions. 
In practice, the preparedness, perception and responsiveness are complementary. The responsiveness actions 
cannot perform an acceptable operation without a good perception scheme. The restoration may also be limited 
without appropriate preparedness measures.  
It is easy to notice that the implementation of redundancy relies much on redundant hardware, e.g. 
switches, energy meters and even backup energy sources, thus leads to low efficiency and high cost. The 
designer should make a balance between efficiency and resilience. Usually, the requirement for resilience level 
is different, considering a wide range of situations. In applications such as hospitals, military uses, or large 
power plants, the demand for uninterruptable power supplies usually calls for a high resilience of the system. 
Furthermore, although the concept of resilience is important in nowadays applications, it still lacks evident 
indices that can perform a proper evaluation of the microgrid resilience. Therefore, how to evaluate the system 
resilience require to be further discussed. 
4. Conclusions 
The microgrid system, highly integrated with networks faces new challenges concerning security issues. 
This article focused on enhancing the security of microgrid systems from both the cyber layer and the physical 
layer. In this perspective, the communication security, attack detection, mitigation and resilience improvement 
technologies for the microgrid system have been presented. 
Involved with ICT, the IoT-enabled microgrid plays a crucial role in the distributed power system, which 
contributes to a more complicated P2P energy transaction network. Therefore, the microgrid communication 
network (stacks, protocols and models) should be constructed both in IoT-domain and energy-domain. 
The attack detection and mitigation strategies are new technologies that should be introduced to address 
cybersecurity issues for the microgrid system. The attack detection schemes attempt to generate an alarm 
during attacks, while attack mitigation methods aim to eliminate the consequent effects in the presence of 
attacks. 
To present some actions to achieve restoration and prevent the system from physical destruction, the 
resilience of microgrid required to be improved. This can be achieved by increasing the situational awareness 
of microgrid, which consists of preparedness, perception and responsiveness. The preparation generally 
requests a reinforced and redundant hardware design of the system. The perception is responsible for 
monitoring the operational environment. And eventually, the responsiveness forces the microgrids to performs 
effectively to deal with cyber-attacks. 
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